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RESUMEN: Este artículo no busca solucionar la 
cuestión del sentido y de la relevancia del con-
cepto hegeliano de Absoluto. Más bien, busca 
arrojar nueva luz sobre la posibilidad de una 
relación con el Absoluto, que es, la posibilidad 
de que el Absoluto sea algo -una entidad con la 
que nosotros, en tanto que sujetos, podemos 
tener una relación real. Para la plausibiilidad de 
mi lectura del Absoluto, comienzo ofreciendo 
una interpretación del «Fragmento de sistema» 
de Hegel. Intento, entonces, dar sustancia a la 
idea de tal relación trayendo a colación el pen-
samiento de Hans Blumenberg, sorprendente-
mente, un pensador no hegeliano. Tras mostrar 
que también Blumengerg, pugna con la cuestión 
de nuestra relación con el absoluto,  aunque en 
un contexto completamente diferente, arguyo 
que la lectura de Blumenberg del absoluto, como 
un transformdo contra el que la humanidad se 
posiciona persistentemente, sugiere una nueva 
dirección, plena de sentido, en los esfuerzos 
actuales para interpretar el Absoluto hegeliano.
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ABSTRACT: This article does not seek 
to settle the question of the meaning and 
significance of Hegel’s notion of the Abso-
lute. Rather, it seeks to shed new light on 
the possibility of a relationship with the 
Absolute, that is, the possibility that the 
Absolute is something – some entity that 
we, as subjects, can have a real relation to. 
To make my case for the plausibility of my 
reading of the Absolute, I begin by offering 
an interpretation of Hegel’s “System Frag-
ment.” I then attempt to add substance to the 
idea of such a relationship by adducing the 
thought of Hans Blumenberg, a strikingly 
‘non-Hegelian’ thinker. After showing that 
Blumenberg, too, struggled with the ques-
tion of our relation to the absolute, albeit 
in a completely different context, I argue 
that Blumenberg’s reading of the absolute, 
as a backdrop against which humankind 
persistently positions itself, suggests a mean-
ingful new direction in the ongoing efforts 
to interpret the Hegelian Absolute.
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Two Ways to Read Hegel’s Absolute
In this paper, I discuss the question of how our relation to the Hegelian Ab-solute is to be understood. Hegel’s Absolute is commonly understood in two 
opposed ways: on the one hand, the theological approach construes the Absolute 
(God) as that which is separate from us by definition, inasmuch as God created 
humans as mortal and limited; on the other, the philosophical approach to the 
Absolute construes it as a self-relation: the Absolute is that which fully compre-
hends itself as unified, non-self-limiting, free. On the former model, humans 
can indeed enter into a relationship with the Absolute, but it is a relationship 
that is inherently asymmetrical and distant. On the latter model, there can be 
no real, non-trivial, relationship with the Absolute, since everything is basically 
a manifestation of the Absolute. 
It is also possible to approach the dichotomy with regard to the interpreta-
tion of the Absolute somewhat differently, and present it as a divergence from 
a perspective that frames the question about the Absolute analytically, asking 
whether it has independent substantive content. 
Is Hegel putting forward a self-standing account of the Absolute, an ac-
count that isn’t presented in terms of the history of philosophy or of religious 
or aesthetic praxis? Can we only describe the Absolute by describing the devel-
opment of the various realms of knowledge of which it is composed, or can we 
articulate its nature in some other way? It might be suggested that the Absolute 
does, indeed, have a unique description that is not formulated in terms of its 
history and constituent elements. For it could be claimed that the self-standing 
description in question is a purely formal description, lacking any independent 
content whatsoever. In other words, not only is it not formulated in terms of 
God, or the ultimate, most evolved form of art or religion, but it speaks only of 
Spirit’s «return to itself» and Spirit’s attaining «full and complete self-knowl-
edge»; to put it more ‘ontologically,’ it speaks of closing the gap between that 
which Spirit thinks, and that which is. Yet even were we to accept the claim 
that the purported self-standing account of the Absolute is nothing more than 
a formal condition that the Absolute must satisfy – namely, that the Absolute 
must have complete and exhaustive self-knowledge – it would nonetheless be 
the case that the description of the Absolute must still reflect all the various 
historical manifestations, i.e., modes of social and cultural organization, by 
means of which it is revealed and actualized. For these manifestations are 
not contingent, but necessary, aspects of the Absolute’s self-knowledge and 
actualization. The fully comprehensive description of the actualized Absolute, 
the Absolute that has undergone the process of self-unfolding and self-under-
standing, is thus the description of that process of self-unfolding itself, rather 
than a description of a product of that process.
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Whether there can be an independent description of the Absolute, or all we 
have, at best, is a criterion for what would constitute a satisfactory description, 
this approach to discussing the Absolute sets out from the premise that the 
Absolute exists, and seeks to offer a detailed account of what that entails. It is, 
however, also possible to approach the Absolute from the opposite direction: 
instead of taking the Absolute as a starting point in need of elucidation, we 
can set out from the perspective of that which is not absolute, but finite, to use 
the Hegelian term, and investigate whether it is possible to render it infinite, 
that is fully self-aware, and fully self-actualized. This self-understanding is 
represented by arrays of human activity, such as art, religion, and philosophy, 
which engender the human contexts within which the finite imparts to itself 
infinite meaning and eternal existence.
Which starting point one adopts in seeking a reading of the Absolute – as-
suming its existence as that which is in the process of becoming fully actualized 
and has full self-knowledge, or taking the notion of the Absolute to be ‘merely’ 
a characterization of human activities that have attained full self-awareness – 
reflects one’s interpretive stance on Hegel’s relationship to Kant’s metaphysics. 
If we grant that Hegel accepts Kant’s critique of metaphysics, we will have 
to choose the ‘non-metaphysical’ starting point, whereas if we view Hegel’s 
thought as a reaction which attempts to repudiate Kant’s critique  and reinstate 
discussion of the Absolute, we will have to choose the ‘metaphysical’ premise. 
But one’s choice of starting point is not solely an interpretive matter, for textual 
considerations also play a role. If one’s primary source text is The Science of 
Logic, the metaphysical reading is more apt. But if the primary source text is the 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, where the transition from Objective 
Spirit to Absolute Spirit is compatible with construals on which the Absolute 
is understood as a description as well as construals on which the Absolute is 
understood as an actual state of affairs, it may be the case that the ‘correct’ 
reading is that which is able to meld the two construals into a single unified 
reading of the Absolute. Such a unified reading would presumably invoke a 
structure akin to Spinoza’s ‘single substance with two attributes’ model.1
It is thus possible to frame the dichotomy between the theological and 
philosophical readings of the Absolute as a dichotomy between a metaphysical 
approach and a formal, non-metaphysical approach to the Absolute. And just 
as the Spinozistic model of substance might suggest a direction for bridging the 
gap between the metaphysical and the formal approaches, so too, with regard 
to the dichotomy between the theological and philosophical readings, there 
may be a middle ground.
[1]  See Fulda 2003, 242-56.
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For might it be possible that Hegel had in mind another conception of the 
Absolute, a conception that marries features from both the theological and 
the philosophical models, rendering possible a genuine relationship between 
the individual and the Absolute? I will argue that in the «System Fragment» of 
1800, Hegel indeed sets out such a hybrid approach, an approach that cannot 
be construed in the classic sense of a reflecting subject’s self-relation.
Hegel’s Absolute:  An Undefendable Concept?
The claim that Hegel’s philosophy revolves around the Absolute and that, 
in many respects, the Absolute constitutes both its point of departure and its 
ultimate objective, should come as no surprise to anyone even vaguely familiar 
with Hegelian thought. Likewise, few would deny that a formidable challenge 
awaits present-day readers who seek not only to grasp what Hegel had in mind 
when he spoke of the Absolute, but more importantly, to arrive at a construal of 
the Absolute that is personally meaningful. It is safe to say that the concept of 
the Absolute seems utterly alien and farfetched to the contemporary mind. As 
Charles Taylor, who cannot be suspected of lacking sympathy for the Hegelian 
enterprise, puts it:
But how do we get from mere ‘objective Spirit’ to something absolute? ... If the 
development of Reason in history … is in fact the necessary unfolding of the 
stages of Geist and Reason itself, then we have an unchallengeable grounding in 
reality and truth itself. But I don’t suppose anyone can accept this today. (Taylor 
1999, 158-59, italics added)
It is both thought-provoking and ironic that this profound sense of alien-
ation is not the result of the tremendous change in the historical context from 
Hegel’s day to our own, which has generated an unbridgeable gap – a verita-
ble chasm – between us and Hegel. Rather, it stems from our whole-hearted 
adoption of a fundamental Hegelian insight: the Absolute does not fully reveal 
itself in its entirety from the outset, but rather, initially manifests itself as oth-
er-than-itself, a mode of presentation that expresses its essence only incomplete-
ly. What is this partial manifestation of the Absolute comprised of? It comprises 
an infinity of ‘moments’ of human activity as they are arrayed over the course of 
history. As partial expressions of the Absolute, these moments are necessary for 
the revelation of the Absolute in its entirety, which Hegel defines dialectically 
as the overcoming of fragmentation and self-otherness. In contemplating the 
Absolute, when we shift our focus from the Absolute itself to the means by which 
the Absolute is revealed, all we have are the historical manifestations – forms 
of social organization and human cultural developments – themselves, on their 
own, independent of their role in the Absolute’s self-disclosure. And it is pre-
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cisely at the point where we accept this partial, contingent, historical existence 
as the only thing that can – from the perspective of human consciousness – be 
known and understood, that we lose the capacity to conceive of the Absolute 
as something real, self-standing, distinct from us. Paradoxically, then, Hegel’s 
insight into the notion of the Absolute gives rise to total scepticism as to its 
feasibility, scepticism that is now, as Taylor noted, endemic.
But perhaps the matter is not as simple as this account implies. Beyond the 
irony and the resounding sceptical conclusion, we may sense that the alienation 
elicited by the notion of the Absolute has not, in fact, completely ruled out the 
possibility that there might nonetheless be something to this grandiose Hege-
lian idea. We may sense that although we question the notion of the Absolute, 
we do not reject it out of hand. For Taylor’s remark can be taken as attesting to 
the conceivability of an Absolute, albeit an Absolute that is alien to us, though 
at the same time voicing doubt as to our ability to say anything significant 
about our connection to it. In this paper, I shift the focus from the intractable 
questions of what the Hegelian Absolute is (or how it became what it is) to 
the question of our relationship to the Absolute. More specifically, I pose the 
following question: does Hegel provide an account, not only of the unfolding 
of the Absolute in history, but also of our relationship to the Absolute once it 
has fully revealed itself as such?
To the Hegelian ear, the question of whether such an account of our connec-
tion to the Absolute has been given might appear to border on the illegitimate, 
or to indicate a lack of familiarity with Hegel’s core vision of the Absolute. For 
surely, students of Hegel might claim, our inability to engage with, let alone 
confront, the Absolute, dictates, from the outset, that our relationship to the 
Absolute is itself a facet of the Absolute; hence to construe our relationship to 
the Absolute as a problem that we must address is to assume that we are distinct 
from the Absolute, an assumption contrary to Hegel’s core concept. This is a 
potent argument that compels me to clarify the legitimacy of my claim that the 
nature of the Absolute – as conceived by Hegel himself – does not preclude our 
taking it as a separate and distinct object of scrutiny. Only after the feasibility 
of doing so has been established will we be able to move on to assessment of 
the adequacy of Hegel’s elucidation of our relation to the Absolute, and to my 
own suggestions about how the relationship might be fruitfully understood. 
In making these suggestions, I draw on Hans Blumenberg’s approach to the 
said relationship. Though formulated in a very different context, his approach 
provides significant insight into what the Absolute might mean to us today.
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Reading Hegel’s «System Fragment»
Let us first turn to Hegel and explore whether it is possible to validate my 
framing the question of our relation to the Absolute as a problem. A good point 
of departure is the essay known as the «System Fragment» of 1800 (Hegel 1961 
[1800]), which not only sets forth one of the first formulations of Hegel’s notion 
of the Absolute, but more importantly, also explicitly engages with the question 
of the individual’s relationship to the Absolute. Hegel asserts that unity must be 
regarded as a self-particularizing, self-differentiating multiplicity. In essence, 
this description of an initial unity that becomes fragmented into particularized 
units already suggests that the relationship between the Absolute and the indi-
vidual is problematic. An individual element within this self-differentiation can 
be contemplated either via its relationship to all the other elements – that is, in 
terms of its place within the manifold of unified particulars – or by differenti-
ating it from these other particulars as an element that stands in juxtaposition 
to them, and negates them. On the former construal, that is, if the individual 
is construed in terms of its place within the manifold, the individual cannot 
be grasped as fully distinct, but must be grasped in terms of its situation rela-
tive to other individuals in the ‘unity that is a multiplicity.’ The second option, 
which defines the individual, not in terms of its position relative to the other 
particulars, but in contradistinction to the other particulars, thus appears to 
be more promising. This construal views the individual as defined by its being 
juxtaposed to, and separate from, the other particulars; it is this oppositional 
relationship that renders the individual independent.
The continuation of the «System Fragment» makes it clear that Hegel 
favours this option, that is, favours construing the individual as gaining an 
independent identity through separation, even if this separation is constrained 
from the outset by the primordial unity with respect to which – or in opposition 
to which – the separation is defined. Note, however, that to argue that for He-
gel, the separation imperative is more compelling than the construal on which 
individual is defined and rendered unique by its role within the manifold, is to 
adopt the vantage point of the individual. On this perspective, the individual, 
cognizant of his reliance on others, seeks to frame his separation not simply in 
terms of negation, of what she is not, but affirmatively as well, in terms of her 
uniqueness, her particular and distinct selfhood.
Now it might be claimed that, if we assume that the individual’s im-
pulse toward separation is indeed the crux of the matter, then we need not 
give further consideration to the other perspective, namely, the perspective 
of the initial self-differentiating unity itself, and we can restrict ourselves to 
examining the interactions between individuals who seek to define their own 
uniqueness through their mutual relations. But to adopt this approach would 
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in effect be capitulation to the very scepticism about the Absolute that Taylor 
spoke of, and Hegel does not choose this easy way out. He does not make do 
with considering the individual solely in terms of the interrelations in which 
she takes part, interrelations that, viewed in aggregate, generate a closed and 
self-sufficient totality. In place of this constructivist approach, Hegel approaches 
the individual, not only in terms of the separation imperative, that is, in terms 
of the individual’s willingness to stand up to the totality she seeks to separate 
from, and in defiance of which she takes actions that mark her as unique, but 
also from the opposite perspective, the perspective of the Absolute. In one 
of the key sentences in the opening section of the «System Fragment,» Hegel 
frames the individual–totality relationship as a kind of reciprocal dependence:
Der Begriff der Individualität schließt Entgegensetzung gegen unendliche 
Mannigfaltigkeit und Verbindung mit demselben in sich; ein Mensch ist ein 
individuelles Leben, insofern er ein anderes ist als alle Elemente und als die 
Unendlichkeit der individuellen Leben außer ihm; er ist nur ein individuelles 
Leben, insofern er eins ist mit allen Elementen, aller Unendlichkeit der Leben 
außer ihm. (TWA1, 419–20)
The concept of individuality includes opposition to infinite variety and also inner 
association with it. A human being is an individual life in so far as he is to be 
distinguished from all the elements and from the infinity of individual beings 
outside himself. But he is only an individual life in so far as he is at one with all 
the elements, with the infinity of lives outside himself. (Hegel 1961 [1800], 310)
Even in this early rendering, we can discern an essential feature of He-
gel’s mature concept of the Absolute, formulated after he had worked out the 
concept of Spirit, namely, the reciprocal dependence between the finite and 
infinite, between the totality and the particulars of which it is comprised. But 
conspicuously missing here (and developed by Hegel later, in the Jena writings 
and the Phenomenology of Spirit) is a description of this mutual dependence in 
terms of the idea of the one’s being an expression of the other – and vice versa – a 
description that explains the structure of the relationship between the totality 
itself and its component parts.
Some have claimed that once Hegel articulates both the notion of the 
Spirit, and the idea that Spirit, and the particulars of which it is comprised, 
are really expressions of each other, the option of defining separation in terms 
of an oppositional relation to the Absolute, and interpreting the relationship 
between the individual and the Absolute as oppositional, as premised on robust 
separation, becomes moot, and instead, the relationship posits a separation that 
is no more than the reflexive relation of ‘self-otherness.’ Is this indeed the case? 
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Does construing the relationship between the Absolute and the particulars that 
comprise it in the strong sense of ‘standing up to,’ of robust separation—even 
though the separating particular is at the same time an integral part of the 
Absolute—really become moot? Those who seek to claim that it does will ad-
duce the continuation of the «System Fragment» to show that the relationship 
between the totality (the Absolute) and its components can be understood 
as oppositional only on the theological premise that there is a fundamental 
distinction between divine infinitude and human finitude. They will cite as 
compelling proof of this Hegel’s assertion that the gap, the fundamental sepa-
ration between the finite and the infinite, is bridgeable only by way of religion 
and its rituals – ritual sacrifice, for instance, as Hegel notes in the «System 
Fragment» – and not by way of philosophy. Moreover, since, on my reading of 
Hegel’s view, philosophy is grounded in reflection, and the reflective stance both 
causes the separation, and perpetuates it, philosophy’s inability to bridge the 
gap is not contingent, but of the essence. Those who argue that the ‘separation 
imperative’ construal of the individual–Absolute relationship is moot in Hegel’s 
mature philosophy insist that setting aside theology and pursuing philosophy 
in its stead makes it possible to relinquish engagement with the question of the 
relationship between man and the Absolute, since philosophy conceives of the 
Absolute solely as a self-relation, that is, it takes the Absolute to be identical to 
the Absolute’s relation to itself.
I will now propose a different way to read the «System Fragment,» a read-
ing on which there is continuity between the «System Fragment» and Hegel’s 
more developed doctrine of Spirit. The «System Fragment» seeks to describe 
and explain how the separation came about, and how it might be overcome. It 
tells us that the individual is grasped as such only within a broader framework 
– the Absolute. And it is not merely part of the totality, but rather, its connec-
tion with the Absolute is a ‘default’ position, so that even after the process of 
self-awareness and recognition of its uniqueness, followed by its separation, the 
individual is still imbued with longing to return to the Absolute and be part of 
it. Nevertheless, separation is indeed a necessary condition for the individual’s 
emergence as such, for its full identity as a discrete particular. If this charac-
terization captures Hegel’s intent in the «System Fragment,» then it seems 
to me we must conclude that his supposed abandonment of the theological 
solution in the Jena writings and the Phenomenology of Spirit does not, in fact, 
reflect a major shift in the underlying issue Hegel is addressing, but rather its 
reframing as a philosophical problem. This reframing does not mean that the 
issues that motivated the «System Fragment» have been set aside, but that they 
are now formulated in a manner that focuses on understanding the Absolute 
and its development. This change in focus – from the process that engenders 
the autonomous, non-dependent individual, who is nonetheless conscious of 
103Hegel on the Absolute, with a Blumenbergian twist
Studia Hegeliana vol. II (2016)
the fact that her dependence is a necessary condition for the possibility of her 
independence, to the process of the Absolute’s development – arises from the 
nature of the former process. When the autonomous individual’s perspective is 
the point of departure, the impulse to achieve separation is well-grounded, but 
there is no good explanation for the inherent impulse to return to the original 
context from which the individual sprang, and on which her unique identity 
depends. Only when separation from the Absolute is grasped as profoundly 
connected to the manner in which the Absolute comes to understand itself 
through the individual’s quest for independence can we avoid the problematics 
of the individual’s desire to return to its pre-separation origins, to return to 
and be part of the Absolute. For in essence, the individual never separates from 
the context that makes the quest for separation possible, and that context – the 
Absolute – is, in effect, part of that quest. The Absolute is an integral part of the 
project of separating from the Absolute. Hence the explanatory focus cannot 
be the individual’s effort to gain independence, but must be the Absolute from 
and through which the individual strives to be independent.
But is the price that Hegel pays for this change in perspective too steep? If 
the reason for the shift is the need to ground the possibility of independence 
despite the Absolute – and indeed, the Absolute develops into the Absolute 
precisely through the individual’s insistence on independence – then when all 
is said and done, is it not the case that the Absolute is all there is? That is, is 
it not the case that the individual is merely an expression of the Absolute, an 
expression that achieves uniqueness only insofar as it contributes to rendering 
the Absolute itself independent?
To avoid this problematic conclusion, we must, though conceding that we 
are part of the Absolute, return to the question of the individual’s relation to 
the Absolute – the individual’s standing up to the Absolute, juxtaposing herself 
to the Absolute, opposing the Absolute. This return cannot be achieved by re-
verting to the stance of the «System Fragment,» but must relinquish the vantage 
point of the individual seeking independence from the Absolute, and instead, 
taking the Absolute as a given, inquire into the meaning of our inexorable, 
irrevocable connection to it. Admittedly, here Hegel leaves readers in the dark 
in two respects: his presentation of the problem of the individual’s relation to 
the Absolute as a question is very vague, and his account of the Absolute itself, 
which could shed light on that relation, is relatively ‘thin.’ This seems to leave 
us with no choice but to acquiesce in one of the following options. The first is 
a kind of quasi-theological or ‘onto-theological’ approach that guarantees the 
existence of the Absolute as an entity, an ontological reality, to which we have 
a relation. Proponents of this approach attempt to show that although they 
invoke a ‘theological’ model, the ‘theology’ in question is not a traditional 
‘revealed truth’ theology, but rather, a philosophy of the absolute Spirit. The 
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other option restricts the import of the Absolute to the realm of what Hegel 
calls «objective Spirit» – the objectification of consciousness in civil institutions 
such as property, courts, etc. – and seeks to show why the Absolute must be 
understood as describing a certain state of affairs, namely, the conditions that 
can be demonstrated to be the optimal conditions for individuals to achieve 
self-determination. In stipulating these conditions, no ontological claims are 
made, but rather, Hegel describes a framework for social and cultural interaction 
between many people, a framework within which the individual can determine 
and validate her identity.
The former option, that is, the ‘theological/onto-theological’ approach, is 
preferable, not only because it appears to be the more faithful reading of Hegel’s 
stance, but more importantly, because it acknowledges that it is not possible, 
as a matter of principle, for the individual’s self-determination, or validation 
of that self-determination, to be based on the inter-subjective interactions 
that, in aggregate, constitute objective Spirit. This approach comprehends that 
there must always be a gap between the aggregated interactions of individuals, 
interactions by means of which the individual achieves self-determination, and 
the source that confers validity and justification on that process of self-dis-
covery. To formulate this in Hegelian language, absolute Spirit needs its prior 
manifestations as subjective Spirit and objective Spirit because these stages 
enable the individual to achieve self-justification and self-validation, that is, 
to determine and affirm herself both by means of inter-subjective interactions, 
and at the same time, by transcending them. The individual’s transcendence 
of her routine social intercourse confers on the Absolute, or absolute Spirit, a 
unique status. For the Absolute is the locus of the shift from the state of affairs 
in which the individual’s quest for self-determination is contingent and one-sid-
ed, to a state of affairs where the individual’s quest for self-determination is 
a necessary element of, and thus fully in harmony with, the system that gives 
rise to it. This necessary process of transcending, which is intended to ground 
the individual’s self-affirmation and self-determination, however, creates a gap, 
and it is this gap that brings to the fore the problem of the individual’s relation 
to the Absolute. The gap emerges because although we can comprehend the 
necessity of transcending one’s routine social intercourse, this in itself does not 
answer the question of our relation to that which compelled us to undertake 
this transcendence for the sake of becoming who we are.
Clause 553 of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences—the clause that 
opens the section on the Absolute Spirit—summarizes the question in Hegel’s 
characteristically obscure language:
Der Begriff des Geistes hat seine Realität im Geiste. Daß diese in der Identität mit 
jenem als das Wissen der absoluten Idee sei, hierin ist die notwendige Seite, daß 
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die an sich freie Intelligenz in ihrer Wirklichkeit zu ihrem Begriffe befreit sei, 
um die dessen würdige Gestalt zu sein. Der subjektive und der objektive Geist 
sind als der Weg anzusehen, auf welchem sich diese Seite der Realität oder der 
Existenz ausbildet. (TWA10, 366)
The concept of spirit has its reality in spirit. For this reality, in identity with the 
concept, to exist as knowledge of the absolute idea, what is necessary is that the 
implicitly free intelligence should in its actuality be liberated to its concept in order 
to be its fitting shape. Subjective and objective spirit have to be seen as the road 
along which this aspect of reality or existence develops. (Hegel 1997 [1830], 138)
I cannot provide a detailed analysis of this important paragraph here, but 
let me summarize its import. The opening statement that the actualization 
of the concept of Spirit lies in Spirit itself is essentially making a declaration 
as to Spirit’s absolute nature, its independence of everything but itself. The 
final sentence contends that absolute Spirit’s uniqueness is determined by the 
experiences it underwent as subjective Spirit and objective Spirit, by means of 
which Spirit as concept becomes identical to its actuality. Both these readings 
are endorsed by most Hegel scholars. The interpretation of the middle sentence, 
however, is more controversial. It can be argued that the second sentence de-
scribes one who has grasped the concept of absolute Spirit, that is, it describes 
the individual, the finite consciousness, who, having gone through the earlier 
stages in Spirit’s development, is ready to know the Absolute, namely, the entity 
that is self-actualizing. But if so, we might argue that it is legitimate to question 
whether the concept of Spirit, which entails its own actuality, is dependent 
on the existence of a finite consciousness that is cognizant of it. Perhaps this 
quandary is no more than a misunderstanding that can be resolved by noting 
that the cognizing subject must be grasped as part of the development of Spirit 
itself, and indeed, the cognizing subject is simply an aspect of Spirit’s own 
self-knowledge. In any event, I will not focus on such quandaries, but mention 
them only to point out that the fact that these sorts of ‘riddles’ are frequently 
raised, and the very ambiguity of Hegel’s account of the Absolute, should be seen 
as inviting us to reconsider the question of the relation between the individual 
and the Absolute. Tellingly, it is precisely when the Absolute achieves its full 
actualization, truly becoming absolute, that this question comes to the fore. 
On a personal note, vis-à-vis what philosophers of science call ‘the context of 
discovery,’ my interest in trying to pin down Hegel’s stance concerning this 
question was stimulated by the fact that despite repeated readings of the passages 
in the Hegelian corpus that directly address the concept of the Absolute itself 
– not its potential, not its unfolding, but the Absolute as actualized – I always 
came away with the impression that the discussion was not pursued as far as 
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it could go, and that Hegel transitioned to other concepts, often theological, 
aesthetic, or political, a bit too quickly.
A Blumenbergian Twist 
I will now attempt to narrow the explanatory gap with regard to our re-
lationship to the Absolute by adducing the philosophy of Hans Blumenberg. 
In so doing, I am not claiming that this particular question, in its Hegelian 
context, was addressed by Blumenberg, but only that Blumenberg’s discussion 
of the notion of the absolute sheds light on the question we are considering. I 
will focus mainly on Blumenberg’s concept of the «absolutism of reality.» The 
concept of the «absolutism of reality» is introduced in the opening chapter 
of Blumenberg’s Work on Myth. Blumenberg deftly elucidates his idea in the 
epigraph that graces this chapter – a quote from one of Franz Kakfa’s letters 
to his friend Max Brod:
They could not put the determining divine principle at sufficient distance from 
themselves; the whole pantheon was only a means by which the determining 
forces could be kept at a distance from man’s earthly being, so that human lungs 
could have air. (Blumenberg 1985, 3)
The possibility of human existence is predicated on the distance that we 
manage to put between ourselves and a certain existential reality, the only 
thing that can be said about which with any confidence is that, were it not for 
that distance, human life would be impossible. In other words, human exist-
ence is profoundly dependent on keeping our distance from an entity that can 
be characterized as absolute precisely because of the totality of the do-or-die 
nature of our relationship to it. Blumenberg, seeking to define the «absolutism 
of reality,» further develops the idea expressed in the epigraph:
Absolutism of reality. What it means is that man came close to not having control 
of the conditions of his existence and, what is more important, believed that he 
simply lacked control of them. (Blumenberg 1985, 3–4)
Blumenberg’s definition of the «absolutism of reality» does not appear to 
touch on the objective side of the reality that is characterized as «absolute.» 
Rather, it emphasizes the subjective side – the conscious moment when man 
feels, or believes that he feels, that he is about to lose control over the necessary 
conditions for maintaining his existence. From the continuation of Blumen-
berg’s account, however, it becomes abundantly clear that what led to the mo-
ment of trepidation was a change in man’s physical attributes and abilities as 
a result of evolutionary adaptation to the changed environmental conditions 
under which he lived. According to Blumenberg, this critical change was man’s 
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pre-historic transition from walking on all fours to the upright, two-legged 
stance. The change marks the moment in human pre-history when man’s per-
ceived harmony with his environment was disturbed, as from that moment on, 
the changed environment, now viewed as threatening due to man’s expanded 
field of vision and exposure to the wide-open horizon, became an absolute that 
imperilled human survival.
The absolute’s emergence as a problem also marked the emergence of the 
problem of man’s relation to the absolute, as it was now clear that one’s exist-
ence depended on the manner in which one contended with the absolute. Yet 
the absolute was not something foreign, but was that which made existence 
possible. Blumenberg, who is committed to an anthropogenic description, de-
fines the formative moment as a «situational leap.» It is the moment when the 
human race – not, admittedly, the individual who seeks independence, as in 
the Hegelian context – differentiated itself from the absolute. Juxtaposing itself 
to, and positioning itself in opposition to, the conditions vital for its existence, 
the human race in essence separated itself from the absolute, and in so doing, 
construed human existence as a problem.
Hegel presents the idea of separation as a problem inherent in existence 
itself, though it can only be grasped, described, and explained through the 
medium, the vehicle, of man. Blumenberg, by contrast, takes separation to be 
an arbitrary phenomenon that, given the human propensity to devise concepts 
or symbols, comes to play an explanatory role. It is striking that although the 
metaphysical dimension of the Hegelian account is absent from the Blumen-
bergian account, this does not render the notion of the absolute superfluous 
in the context of the latter. Quite the contrary: according to Blumenberg, the 
absolute is a permanent backdrop against which, and in opposition to which, 
humankind persistently positions itself. If, on the basis of Blumenberg’s short 
description of the dependence of the emergence of mankind on the emergence 
of the absolute – and vice versa – we posit a degree of structural affinity between 
the Blumenbergian account of our relation to the absolute and the Hegelian 
account of that relation as I interpreted it above, we can proceed to consider 
whether the Blumenbergian account enhances our understanding of Hegel. 
Although the structural affinity, in itself, does not obviate the many important 
differences between the two accounts, it does, in my estimation, suffice for us to 
deem Blumenberg’s account a plausible source of insight into Hegel’s account.
Blumenberg maintains that humans, since emerging on the landscape of 
pre-history, have sought to sidestep a challenge that appeared on the scene con-
currently, namely, the challenge of directly contending with the problem of the 
absolute. The history of human culture records humankind’s incessant efforts 
to evade the absolute. Indeed, this history can be understood as a continuous 
struggle to avert the danger of being further exposed to, and thus vulnerable to, 
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the absolute. Since these ongoing evasive efforts have a history of their own, it is 
worthwhile, in the quest to elucidate our relation to the absolute, to contemplate 
the beginnings of this history. Moreover, the unceasing and assiduous effort to 
evade the absolute in essence amounts to perpetual affirmation of its existence. 
In his Work on Myth, (1985) Blumenberg conceptualizes this duality by, inter 
alia, distinguishing between the work of myth and work on myth. Investigating 
the work of myth involves an attempt to trace the earliest efforts to evade the 
absolute, though with the full knowledge that the historical moment when the 
absolute emerged, setting the stage for the ensuing evasive manoeuvres, can 
never be pinned down. This inability does not reflect a cognitive limitation, 
but rather an ontological limitation, for human existence was secured only as 
a result of the original act of evasion, namely, creation and maintenance of 
distance between humans and possible predators. Consequently, despite our 
persistent efforts, and no matter how much time has elapsed since they began, 
or how much longer they will continue, we can never be certain that the threat 
of the absolute has been completely removed. This decisive fact compels man to 
engage in unceasing «work on myth,» as the primordial myths are our earliest 
source depicting the evasive endeavour. The repeatedly failed attempts to put 
an end to the absolute attest to the profound need to preserve the very earliest 
attempts, which date back to the dawn of human civilization. The ongoing «work 
on myth,» in its exceedingly varied forms, constitutes the historic concretiza-
tion of the evasive enterprise—maintaining distance between ourselves and 
that which threatens us, constructing a safe space within which our existence 
is possible. But as I noted above, the endless nature of this work, and the inex-
orable lack of a criterion that can definitively establish whether conditions are 
ripe for discontinuing the practice of doggedly keeping our distance from the 
absolute, affirms the absolute no less resolutely. As Blumenberg puts it:
Man is always already on this side of the absolutism of reality, but he never entirely 
attains the certainty that he has reached the turning point in his history at which 
the relative predominance of reality over his consciousness and his fate has turned 
into the supremacy of the subject. There is no criterion for this turning, for this 
‘point of no return’ (Blumenberg 1985, 9).
One would be hard-pressed to find a more unequivocal affirmation of the 
absolute. The absolute, à la Blumenberg, is such that any attempt to dismiss 
it or render it extraneous, by claiming that it is no longer meaningful or that 
its utility has been fully exhausted, is thwarted by the enmeshment of human 
self-understanding and the notion of the absolute.
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Back to Hegel’s Absolute
Let us return to the quandary addressed in this article. On the one hand, 
any attempt to defend the Hegelian position seems to require a comprehensive 
exposition of the notion of the Absolute, but on the other, it seems that any 
such exposition is doomed to failure from the outset. While there is a broad 
consensus that the concept of the Absolute is a cornerstone of Hegel’s thought, 
attempts to provide a convincing interpretation have floundered. Two main 
approaches to the Hegelian Absolute have emerged. One suggests that, in light 
of its foreignness to the contemporary philosophical mindset, it be abandoned; 
the other seeks to denude it of its substantive metaphysical import, and in-
terprets it as referring only to a specific state of affairs within the conceptual 
framework of objective Spirit. As we have also seen, however, it is impossible 
to downplay the significance of the Absolute, or dismiss it altogether, without 
jeopardizing the distinctive Hegelian outlook and the core rationale underlying 
Hegel’s philosophy. Yet we cannot embrace a reading of the Absolute that does 
not allow us to invoke this concept without an accompanying sense that it is 
alien, vacuous, preposterous.
There is, however, a plausible option available to us: bearing in mind 
the Blumenbergian conception of the absolute, we can re-visit, and perhaps 
embrace, the Hegelian stance that comprehending the Absolute is the goal 
of philosophy. Blumenberg’s account allows us to interpret Hegel’s Absolute 
as activity, namely, the ongoing effort to successfully distance ourselves from 
that which is humanly unbearable. Engagement in this enterprise unfailingly 
affirms those involved in the project, while at the same time affirming the re-
ality of the absolute itself. Against this backdrop, Odo Marquard’s distillation 
of the essence of Blumenberg’s philosophical project is, I believe, equally true 
vis-à-vis Hegel. Marquard characterized this project – as Blumenberg himself 
characterized human culture in general – as the ongoing attempt to liberate 
ourselves from, or to reduce the burden imposed on us by, the absolute in its 
myriad forms. We do so by seeking to create a safe space, a buffer zone, between 
ourselves and the absolute.
Der Grundgedanke der Philosophie von Hans Blumenberg schien mir und scheint 
mir der Gedanke der Entlastung vom Absoluten zu sein. Die Menschen halten 
das Absolute – als Wirklichkeit und als Gott – nicht aus: sie müssen Distanz zu 
ihm gewinnen. (Marquard 1999, 19)
This article has not sought to settle the question of the meaning and signif-
icance of Hegel’s notion of the Absolute. Rather, it has sought to shed new light 
on the possibility of a relationship with the Absolute, that is, the possibility that 
the Absolute is something – some entity that we, as subjects, can have a real 
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relation to. To make my case for the plausibility of my reading of the Absolute, 
I began by offering an interpretation of Hegel’s «System Fragment.» I then 
attempted to add substance to the idea of such a relationship by adducing the 
thought of Hans Blumenberg, a strikingly ‘non-Hegelian’ thinker. After show-
ing that Blumenberg, too, struggled with the question of our connection to the 
absolute, albeit in a completely different context, I argued that Blumenberg’s 
reading of the absolute as a backdrop against which humankind persistently 
positions itself, suggests a meaningful new direction in the ongoing efforts to 
interpret the Hegelian Absolute.
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